United Nations Update by Shinerock, Solomon
Human Rights Brief




American University Washington College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Column is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Human Rights Brief by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Shinerock, Solomon. "United Nations Update." Human Rights Brief 14, no.3 (2007): 51-52.
51
ICJ Decision on Srebrenica
Genocide Does Little For Victims
But May Advance the Rule of Law
The U.N.’s International Court of Justice
(Court or ICJ) recently acquitted the Serbian
government of complicity in the 1995 mas-
sacre of 8,000 Muslim Bosnians in
Srebrenica. The judgment evoked bitter dis-
appointment from victims and victims’ fami-
lies, to whom it denied both closure and the
possibility of reparations from the Serbian
government. However, the judgment con-
firms principles of international law that may
have a deterring impact on the future com-
mission of genocide. This was the Court’s first
case brought under the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Convention). The Court held that
Serbia had violated the Convention by not
preventing the killing, and by failing to pro-
duce former government officials that have
been indicted for genocide and other war
crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
While it accepted that genocide had
occurred at Srebrenica, the Court did not find
that Serbia, “through its organs or persons
whose acts engage its responsibility under cus-
tomary international law,” had committed,
conspired to commit, incited the commission
of, or been complicit in the commission of
genocide. In short, the prosecution failed to
prove that Serb General Ratko Mladic was
acting as an official organ of the Serbian state
when he directed the genocide at Srebrenica.
Although Serbia’s links with Mladic and the
Bosnian-Serb troops who committed the mas-
sacre were close and firmly established, the
11-judge majority did not find this to be suf-
ficient proof of the intent required to convict
Serbia of complicity in the genocide. Four of
the 15 judges dissented from the majority
finding.
Though the majority did not find Serbia
complicit in the massacre at Srebrenica, it did
find that the massacre was foreseeable, and
that Serbia therefore violated the Convention
by failing to prevent it. In other words, Serbia
“could and should” have stop genocide. A 14-
vote majority found a second violation of the
Convention in Serbia’s failure to hand over
Mladic. In response, the Court ordered that
Serbia “shall immediately take effective steps
to ensure full compliance with its obligation
under [the Convention, and] transfer individ-
uals accused of genocide … for trial by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia.” 
The decision concludes ten months of
deliberation and 14 years of trial. Bosnia filed
the case in 1993 — disturbingly, prior to the
Srebrenica massacre — to raise already-exist-
ing claims under the Convention. It was the
first instance of a state being charged with
genocide, and the first time that the ICJ had 
arbitrated a dispute arising under the
Convention, which was signed in 1948 fol-
lowing the Nazi Holocaust. As such, the deci-
sion has both immediate and far-reaching
implications.
Most immediately, however, the judgment
means that affected Bosnians have yet to
receive the symbolic closure of this bloody
chapter in their lives. The Serbian govern-
ment will not have to pay reparations to vic-
tims’ families.
In acquitting Serbia of complicity in the
Srebrenica genocide, the ICJ rejected the doc-
trine of vicarious liability that might other-
wise apply because of the military assistance
the Bosnian-Serbs received from Belgrade.
The ICJ has insisted that unless Belgrade gave
“direct orders” for particular operations, or
unless the Bosnian-Serbs were “completely
dependent” on Belgrade, there is no liability
at all. Critics of the decision note that this is
inconsistent with prevailing theories of tort
law, under which responsibility for wrongdo-
ing can be shared. It is also inconsistent with
the international doctrine of command
responsibility, which holds military officers
responsible for the actions of subordinates
under their command. The fact that the mas-
sacre was directed by Serbian General Mladic
suggests that responsibility would transfer
under either liability theory.
Prominent international lawyer Antonio
Cassese noted the Court’s acceptance that “the
Serbian government was paying salaries to
Mladic and his colleagues, as well as providing
financial and military assistance.” This evi-
dence should have been enough to establish
complicity, argued Cassese, even without
proof that Serbian officials sent specific
instructions ordering the genocide. Another
writer suggests that the requisite intent should
have been inferred from the pattern of ethnic
killings beginning in the early 1990s. 
The ICJ judgment is also striking because,
while it finds the mass murder of almost
8,000 Bosnian Muslim males at Srebrenica
was an act of genocide, it does not reach the
same conclusion for the widespread ethnic
cleansing carried out by the Bosnian Serbs,
mainly in 1992, when tens of thousands were
killed and up to two million were displaced.
This limits the genocide charges that can
effectively be brought against Bosnian-Serb
military leaders to those relating to the
Srebrenica massacre.
David Scheffer, former U.S. Ambassador-
at-Large for War Crimes Issues, highlighted
the judgment’s implications for advancing the
rule of law and human rights. He noted that
the decision “confirms that all states have an
obligation” to take action against people
accused of genocide, “and part of that is
apprehending them.” The decision also con-
firms that genocide and other egregious
crimes occurred, and that the Serbian govern-
ment’s involvement was in violation of the
Genocide Convention. While not the verdict
for which victims were waiting, these findings
hopefully offer some measure of vindication
by recognizing the substantial agency of the
Serbian government in the commission of the
atrocities, and by faulting the government for
inaction.
Next to the violent and irreparable horrors
of genocide, long trials and highly technical
verdicts like the nearly two-hundred page
judgment in this case seem agonizingly inade-
quate. If something constructive is to be
derived from the Court’s decision, it is that
the ability to hold governments accountable
for complicity or failure to prevent genocide
may help to deter the kind of governmental
support that allows genocide to occur on such
a large scale. The decision must also serve as a
guide for future prosecutions of state spon-
sored genocide under the Convention.
U.N. Demand for Accountability
in the Philippines Needs More
The U.N. has pressured the Philippine
government to address a rash of extrajudicial
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killings that are alleged to have been con-
ducted by the military since 2001. The
killings are allegedly political, and have tar-
geted non-combatant, left-wing civic leaders,
activists and journalists. According to local
human rights group Karapatan, the death 
toll as of this writing exceeds 800. While the
government has earmarked 99 courts to deal
with the cases, the prognosis for effective
adjudication is not strong without a vigorous
prosecution.
U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions Philip
Alston reported that the extrajudicial killings
are “convincingly attributed” to the govern-
ment’s armed forces, and have taken place in
a climate of virtual impunity for the perpetra-
tors and vulnerability for witnesses. “The
present message,” reports Alston, “is that if
you want to preserve your life expectancy,
don’t act as a witness.” In addition, the num-
ber of killings has flared because the govern-
ment has abandoned reconciliation attempts
for counterinsurgency strategies that target
left wing groups with military force. 
A government sponsored commission, led
by former Philippine Supreme Court judge
Jose Melo, made findings consistent with the
U.N. report, and local civic groups and jour-
nalists corroborated allegations that an over-
zealous and under-disciplined military is
responsible for the killings. What the U.N.
report has done, according to local journalist
Raul Palangan, is to mainstream the debate
on extrajudicial killings: “no longer can the
killings be dismissed as the wild rantings of a
rabid Left.” The U.N. attention has taken the
debate away from the political arena and
given it an independent, normative footing as
a human rights issue in the eyes of the world.
While president Arroyo has expressed con-
cern, by far the most significant commitment
to addressing the problem has been the
Supreme Court’s order 25-2007. This order
designates 99 courts as special tribunals to try
the killings, sets a rigorous trial schedule, and
prioritizes the prosecution of these crimes.
Such action is consistent with Chief Justice
Puno’s observation that the extrajudicial tak-
ing of life is the ultimate violation of human
rights and constitutes a brazen assault on the
rule of law. The government commission has
recommended that the Court hold military
commanders responsible for killings commit-
ted by subordinates under the doctrine of
command responsibility. 
In contrast to the judicial response, the
army has denied the allegations as “the
enemy’s propaganda,” and claims the U.N.
report fails to recognize the severity of the
communist insurgency threat that lead to the
killings. Roman Catholic Archbishop Oscar
Cruz wrote in his blog that he expects only a
“ceremonial prosecution” of a limited number
of soldiers implicated in the killings.
Reflecting these concerns is the fact that
the Philippine Justice Department has so far
shown lackluster performance in bringing
prosecutions. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzalez
has joined the army in criticizing the U.N.
report, and, according to the Philippine Daily
Inquirer, has directed hostility at parties seek-
ing to open investigations into the killings.
The special tribunals will be useless if cases are
not filed, and if the prosecutorial arm of the
Justice Department is not mobilized to pursue
the opportunity for expedited prosecution.
Thus far, the prosecution has not taken action
consistent with the Supreme Court’s order
allowing aggressive prosecution of the extraju-
dicial killings. The U.N. and the government
commission have helped to make justice avail-
able — they should go further to ensure that
justice prevails. HRB
Solomon Shinerock, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, covers the United Nations
Update for the Human Rights Brief.
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